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GENERAL

| Soviet Union plans appointment of new ambassador | ors: | ambassado | new am | of nev | appointment | plans | Union | Soviet | 1. |
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| 25X1A | Ambassador Kennan reports from Moscow that he was told by the British Ambassador that the Soviet Union has indicated its desire to appoint Andrei Gromyko as Ambassador (Gront Britain |
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<u>Comment:</u> Previously the USSR had requested the United States to accept Georgi Zarubin as Ambassador to Washington.

The proposed appointment of these two top foreign service officials to London and Washington may be an indication that the USSR does not anticipate an imminent conflict with the West. The Kremlin may also expect a period of deepening international crisis during which its representatives in London and Washington must be equipped to speak with authority and be capable of accurate analysis of Western intentions.

Gromyko is a specialist in Western affairs, having been Counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1939 to 1943 and later Ambassador to the United States. He participated actively in the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences and was chief Soviet delegate to the UN Security Council from 1946 to 1948. Since that time he has been First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR.

Zarubin's primary experience in Western affairs contrasts with that of Panyushkin, the present Ambassador to the United States, who is a Far Eastern specialist. Zarubin who has been in London since 1946, headed the Soviet diplomatic mission to Ottawa at the time of the Canadian spy case and was chief of the American division of the Soviet Foreign Office. He has frequently been a delegate to Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings and to the UN.

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| 2. | Soviet | feeler | regarding | terms | for | Korean | armistice: |
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In a conversation with an Israeli delegate at the United Nations, Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko, a Russian national, took the initiative in suggesting a new formula for the Korean armistice negotiations. Zinchenko asked for an opinion on the possibility of initialing an armistice agreement on the basis of issues already settled, with the understanding that the agreement would become effective upon settlement of the POW issue.

Zinchenko opened the discussion with a reference to a conversation of a year ago between Malik and the Israeli delegate in which the latter expressed the view that settlement of the German question would be difficult as long as the Korean war continued.

The Israeli delegate commented that Zinchenko was probably 'not freewheeling' and suggested that the Russians were sounding out sentiment on bringing up pending issues such as Korea during the USSR's presidency of the Security Council in June.

Comment: The USSR's first initiative on a Korean settlement occurred in the Malik conversation with the Israeli delegate in March, 1951. Such approaches appear intended both to convey information and gain an impression as to how firmly UN members support the US stand in Korea.

FAR EAST

3. Appointment of new Vietnamese premier stuns Tonkinese:

| An official of the Tonkin govern American Consul in Hanoi that appointment of Nguyen Van Tam ship has been received with "studulity," and predicted that Tam will last only a few month is entirely without Vietnamese backing. The same offic Tam's appointment as a final desperate bid for power by who, he said, induced Bao Dai to name Tam by assuring personal income. - 4 - | news of the to the premier- unned incre- hs, since he ial interprets the French, |
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Security and later as Acting Governor of Tonkin for a period of five months prior to March 1952. His repressive police methods and his liquidation of the popular nationalistic Dai Viet Party, the principal rival of the pro-French ruling faction which Tam represents, earned him the enmity of the Tonkinese. The incumbent governor of Tonkin is reported to have tendered his resignation on learning of the Tam appointment, but was ordered by Bao Dai to remain on duty.

EASTERN EUROPE

| 4, | Ambassador Kennan comm | ments on Rumanian situation: |
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| 25X1A | . | The American Ambassador in Moscow sug- gests that the recent changes in Rumania may be part of a new phase in Soviet foreign |

policy. He speculates that as a result of the present German crisis, the USSR may exploit puppet Satellite forces more boldly to heighten international tension and that, as part of this move, the Russians are taking further steps toward including Rumania in the USSR.

The Ambassador does not feel that integration is imminent, but he suggests the possibility that the present purges and reform of the judicial system may be partly intended to lead the way.

Comment: Although the timing of the Rumanian purges appears to connect them with the East-West struggle in Europe rather than with purely internal causes, a power struggle within the party hierarchy is the major factor.

WESTERN EUROPE

5. Italy prepares to resume direct discussions with Yugoslavia over Trieste:

Italy will propose that direct discussions with Yugoslavia on Trieste be held in London, according to the Secretary of the Italian Foreign

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Ministry. Appropriate instructions are being sent to the Italian Ambassadors in Washington, London, and Paris.

The Italian official pointed out that Italy has not yet replied to the most recent Yugoslav proposal.

Comment: The Italians favor London as the conference site because they now believe that Britain will assume a sympathetic attitude toward Italy.

Foreign Secretary Eden agreed with Secretary Acheson on 27 May that Britain and the United States should consider "imposing" a Trieste settlement on Italy and Yugoslavia.

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LATIN AMERICA

7. Argentine exile predicts June revolt against Peron:

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A June revolt against the Argentine Government, starting with Peron's assassination, has been predicted by an exiled high-ranking naval officer. He states that the future government will be a three-man military junta.

weak revolt could oust Peron in view of the present economic crisis and the government's inadequate control over the interior. He considers the military capabilities of the General Confederation of Labor 'highly overrated,' and states that the army has some hidden arms.

received of an impending revolutionary attempt, but none has indicated how the unidentified plotters would be able to circumvent Peron's rigorous security measures. The armed services have been purged of officers of doubtful loyalty, and there is no evidence of cooperation among civilian opposition groups.

Peron has frequently urged the powerful labor confederation, reportedly armed, to be ready to rise against those who might attempt a revolution.

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